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Abstract 
This paper examines the determinants of the forward-looking disclosures (FLD) in the 
interim financial reports (IFRs) of non-financial firms listed on the Nairobi Securities 
Exchange (NSE). Data were collected from a total of 91 firm-year observations for the mid 
interim periods between 2009 and 2011. A FLD score was developed for each firm in the 
sample based on the firm‟s disclosure of forward-looking statements in its IFR. The results 
indicate that firms with higher debt, better performance, higher capital investment and with 
more concentration of foreign investment tend to have more FLDs in their IFRs. Conversely, 
cross listed firms are associated with lower FLDs, implying that cross listed firms provide 
lower forward-looking information compared to non-cross listed firms. Results show a high 
degree of FLD for better performing firms and firms with higher financial risk. This study 
contributes to literature by providing evidence to which financial reporting incentives 
contribute to FLDs in a developing country where enforcement is weak. As a conclusion, the 
paper recommends firms to provide comprehensive FLDs in future to effectively mitigate 
informational asymmetries between the management and owners of the firms, especially 
firms with more concentrated foreign ownership. 
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1. Introduction 
The frequency of financial information disclosure by firms is one of the means of improving 
capital market efficiency. This occurs through a reduction in the level of informational 
asymmetry. Information with regard to the financial performance and position of a firm in a 
capital market has traditionally been provided through the annual financial reports (AFRs). 
To increase the frequency of disclosures, International Accounting Standard (IAS) 34 
provides guidelines on interim financial disclosures. According to paragraph 8, IAS 34 
explains that an interim financial report (IFR) should include, as a minimum, a condensed 
statement of financial position, a condensed statement of comprehensive income, a 
condensed statement of changes in equity, a condensed statement of cash flows and selected 
explanatory notes (IASB, 1998). However, IAS 34 neither mandates which entities should 
prepare IFRs, nor how frequently they should do so. This withstanding, some economies have 
mandated quoted companies to prepare IFRs, while others have not. Studies have established 
that mandating more frequent IFRs can influence a firm‟s overall disclosure level as well as 
more voluntary disclosures (Gigler and Hemmer, 1998; Einhorn, 2005). In addition to the 
AFR and IFR, investors are exposed to other information sources such as press releases, 
conference calls, direct communication with analysts, profit warnings and cautionary 
statements (Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007). 
This paper focuses on the information contained in IFRs of non financial firms listed on the 
Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) in Kenya. More specifically, the study examines the 
determinants that explain the disclosure of forward-looking disclosures (FLDs) in the 
selected explanatory notes. Kieso et al. (2009) argue that FLDs are useful to investors in their 
decision-making process. FLDs are examined as a dependent variable because investors seem 
to care more about the firm‟s future prospects compared to its past performance (Hussainey, 
2004). As noted by Yee (2004), academic research into interim financial disclosures is 
amazingly sparse. While studies have examined the informational content of interim earnings 
(Opong, 1988), others have examined IFRs and analyst expenditures (Yee, 2004). The 
relevance of FLDs has been recognized by various researchers and even professional bodies 
(AIMR, 2002; Beattie and Pratt, 2002).  
The choice of NSE firms is based on three reasons. First, Kenya is a developing country 
characterised by weak financial reporting enforcement regulations (Bova and Pereira, 2012). 
Second, whereas IFR is mandatory for all listed firms on the NSE, the level of IFR disclosure 
by Kenyan firms has been found to be lower compared to other developing and emerging 
economies (McFie, 2006). Interestingly, annual financial disclosures by Kenyan listed firms 
are relatively higher compared to these countries. This raises the question: what factors 
determine IFR? In a brief commentary on the level of IFR disclosures by Kenyan listed firms, 
McFie (2006) posits that in order to raise every aspect of doing business in Kenya, IFR has to 
be improved. Third, there appears to exist higher heterogeneity in IFR disclosures by firms 
listed on the NSE. While some firms provide extensive IFRs, other firms seem to lag behind. 
Therefore, this paper examines what corporate or ownership characteristics influence this 
interim disclosure behaviour. 
Compared to AFRs, IFRs are subject to less rigid rules (Palepu, 1988) and highly condensed 
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financial statements that provide the minimum possible financial information. Due to 
cost-benefit and other factors, firms opt to provide the basic financial statements (i.e., 
statement of comprehensive income and statement of financial position) only. Firms often 
elect to provide a commentary to the financial statements including current and future 
operations of the company. This provides managers with greater discretion to selectively 
disclose information in interim reports. This contributes to higher heterogeneity in the level 
of interim financial disclosures across various sectors, with some providing more disclosures 
while others providing only the minimum required disclosures.  
The AICPA‟s Special Committee of Financial Reporting states that for a firm to meet user‟s 
changing needs, they should provide more FLDs, focus on the factors that create longer term 
value, including non financial measures and better align information reported externally with 
the information reported internally. Studies have contended that FLDs tend to pre-empt the 
information contained in AFRs (Brown and Niederhoffer, 1968). However, the time horizon 
of the information contained FLDs in IFRs is essential to investors (Skinner, 1994; Johnson et 
al., 1999) and other financial statement users. For instance, financial analysts rely on IFRs 
largely in making their forecasts. This means that if the predictive value of the earnings 
contained in IFRs is anything to go by, then these forecasts must be closely related to the 
earnings in the AFRs. While prior research has demonstrated that IFRs pre-empt AFR 
information (Brown and Niederhoffer, 1968; Brown and Rozeff, 1979; Manegold and 
Nichols, 1983), the predictive ability of IFRs has not been clear. This is partly because 
interim earnings are considered incomplete. Furthermore, IFRs are not audited, rather, they 
are merely „reviewed‟ by the auditors (Frankel et al. 2002). 
On the other hand, FLDs are likely to signal to the market of some (un)expected event(s) 
surrounding the firm. The FLDs include information on future plans and projects which could 
signal strong reactions to the market (Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007). Studies such as Aljifri and 
Hussainey (2007) have examined the determinants of FLDs in annual reports. This study 
shifts focus to the determinants of FLDs by non-financial firms listed on the NSE for the mid 
interim periods between 2009 and 2011. The results indicate that firms with higher debt, 
better performance, higher capital investment and with more concentration of foreign 
investment tend to have more FLDs in their IFRs. Conversely, cross listed firms are 
associated with lower FLDs. Results show a high degree of FLD for better performing firms 
and firms with higher financial risk. As a conclusion, the paper recommends firms to provide 
comprehensive FLDs in future to effectively mitigate informational asymmetries between the 
management and owners of the firms, especially firms with more concentrated foreign 
ownership. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses extant literature and 
the possible determinants of FLDs. Section 3 discusses the methodology adopted for the 
study. The section explains how the forward-disclosure score was calculated and the 
regression model used. Section 4 presents the results and discussion. Finally, section 5 
concludes the paper. 
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2. Extant literature 
In a world of perfect capital markets, the provision of additional disclosures in interim and 
AFRs would not be warranted. In such a case, the firm‟s disclosure strategies would be value 
neutral. However, as previously discussed, the presence of market imperfections such as 
informational asymmetry, the disclosure of additional information has the potential to either 
enhance or erode firm value. Schleicher and Walker (1999) and Hussainey et al. (2003) posit 
that increased FLDs in annual report improve capital market‟s ability to anticipate future 
earnings surprises. Information asymmetry is partly caused by inadequate financial 
disclosures.  
The provision of additional disclosures in both IFRs and AFRs is aimed at minimizing 
informational asymmetry. These additional disclosures signal important information to 
investors who largely base their decisions on financial information. Studies have examined 
the effect of FLDs and informational asymmetry (Coller and Yohn, 1997). It has been argued 
that the provision on forward-looking information (FLI) helps in reducing informational 
asymmetry between managers and investors, thereby reducing the cost of external financing 
(Bujaki et al., 1999). Informational asymmetry might force firms to disclose more FLI in 
their interim reports. This is because of the effect that the disclosure of FLI might have on 
firm value. 
While numerous studies have been performed on the determinants of annual corporate 
disclosures, few studies have examined the determinants of FLDs in interim reports. To the 
best of our knowledge, the study by Aljifri and Hussainey (2007) seems to be the closest with 
this respect. However, Aljifri and Hussainey (2007) examined FLDs in annual reports. This 
paper shifts its focus to interim reports, which have received minimal attention research wise 
by academics as noted by Yee (2004). The benefits of publishing forward disclosures is 
pegged on the role such disclosures play in informing financial statement user decisions. This 
is in addition to reducing the level of informational asymmetry between managers and 
investors (Bujaki et al., 1999). 
Conversely, forward disclosures could be disadvantageous in various aspects. The uncertainty 
involved makes it difficult to forecast the future with accuracy. Again, in accurate forecasts 
might lead to lawsuits (Field et al., 2003; Kieso et al., 2009). This impedes a manager‟s 
motivation to provide FLI. FLDs might reveal useful information for competitors to leverage 
on, and this might negatively impact on the firm‟s future performance. 
2.1 Background on forward-looking information disclosures 
Compared to “backward-looking information”, “forward-looking information” refers to 
information that captures current plans and future forecasts to enable financial statement 
users assess the firm‟s future performance (Hussainey, 2004). It consists of information which 
explains the firm‟s current and future projections meant to enable financial statement users to 
assess a firm‟s future financial performance (Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007). FLDs also include 
non-financial information including any uncertainties surrounding the firm. It contains any 
information about expected risks and uncertainties that could affect the actual results at the 
end of the period in the case of interim results. Such information is mainly contained in the 
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“future outlook” section in the selected explanatory section of an interim report. 
A firm would disclose FLI in its annual reports for a variety of reasons. First, it is one of the 
management‟s strategies to reducing agency conflicts with the shareholders. Disclosing FLI 
can be seen as a managerial effort to prove to the shareholders that they are concerned with 
the firm‟s future growth. Secondly, the disclosure of FLI may be intended to improve the 
firm‟s value. Existing and potential investors are motivated to buy a firm‟s stock if the firm 
demonstrates its commitment to creating value for its owners. In so doing, it appears 
„impressive‟ to the investors.  Aljifri and Hussainey (2007) established that debt ratio and 
profitability of the firm are some of the significant determinants of FLI disclosures in AFRs. 
The disclosure of FLI in IFRs entails extra costs. This discourages firms from providing 
additional disclosures in their IFRs. Prelimiary observation of IFRs for companies in Kenya 
reveal that there exists heterogeneity in the dislosure of FLI. The raises an interesting 
question: what factors motivate firms to disclose FLI in their IFRs? This study performs an 
investigation of some of the firm, industry and ownership factors that would motivate firms 
to provide FLDs. 
2.2 Determinants of forward-looking information 
Extant literature has examined various features and effects of FLI. The accuracy of FLDs in 
annual reports has been examined by Mc Donald (1973), Waymire (1985), Pownall et al. 
(1993), How and Yeo (2001). Skinner (1994), Johnson et al. (1999) examine the time horizon 
related to FLDs. Other studies have examined the market reaction to annual FLDs with the 
aim of examining the informational content of FLDs (Patell, 1976; Penman, 1980; Lev and 
Penman, 1990; Ajinka and Gift, 1984; Waymire, 1984; Mc Nichols, 1989). While the 
informational content of FLDs in interim reports would be an interesting aspect to examine, 
this is not within the scope of this paper. Further research should consider examining the 
informational content of FLDs in IFRs.  
Studies examining the association between disclosures and firm characteristics have produced 
mixed results. A variety of firm-specific characteristics have been found to influence the 
disclosure of FLI, though, with varied results. These factors include: gearing, profitability, 
firm size, liquidity, capital expenditure and the sector in which a firm operates (Dhaliwal, 
1979; Barry and Brown, 1986; Prodham and Harris, 1989; Butler et al., 2006; Aljifri and 
Hussainey, 2007). 
2.2.1 Leverage 
Regarding the disclosure of FLI in annual reports, Aljifri and Hussainey (2007) argue that 
firms that experience a significant increase in gearing are likely to disclose more FLI. 
Wallace et al. (1994) established a positive association between corporate disclosure and 
leverage. The positive association could be explained by the fact that, highly geared firms 
tend to incur more costs in monitoring activities and thus, compensate this by incurring more 
debt. Securing more debt is one strategy firms may pursue in bid to repay existing debt 
holders. On the contrary, Hossain et al. (1994), Raffournier (1995) and Elzahar and 
Hussainey (2012) find gearing to be an insignificant determinant of narrative risk disclosures 
in interim reports. Thus, the association between FLI disclosure and leverage is not clear.  
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2.2.2 Profitability 
It would seem a plausible proposition that managers of more profitable firms might provide 
more information as a way of increasing investor confidence. This in turn leads to a higher 
market value for its shares. As such, a positive association would be expected between 
profitability and the level of FLDs (Wallace et al., 1994); Barako, 2007).  On the contrary, 
firms experiencing declining profitability are also likely to disclose more FLI (Wallace and 
Naser, 1995). Gearing and profitability have been used to assess a firm‟s risk level (Barry and 
Brown, 1986; Prodham and Harris, 1989). One of the motivations for firms to disclose FLI 
could be due to high financial risk.  
The disclosure of FLI by firms experiencing high financial risk could be interpreted as a 
positive signal.  The effect of this could be a reduction in the cost of capital of the firm 
(Dhaliwal, 1979). On the other hand, studies such as McNally et al. (1982) and Raffournier 
(1995) establish insignificant association between the level of disclosure and profitability. 
With reference to IFR, Butler et al. (2006) found that firms that report more frequently are 
more profitable and less risky. Elzahar and Hussainey (2012) find insignificant association 
between profitability and the level of risk disclosures in interim reports. Thus, the direction of 
association between profitability and FLDs is not clear. 
2.2.3 Company-size 
Beattie et al. (2004), Hassan et al. (2006) and Alsaeed (2006) establish a positive relationship 
between the level of corporate disclosures and firm size. This implies that large firms provide 
more FLI disclosures. This could be attributed to the resources that they control. Small firms 
on the other hand, have fewer resources and thus are not in a position to provide more 
information owing to the associated costs. Again, large companies have larger investor 
following and are able to justify the benefits of providing this extra and costly information. It 
would also seem a strategy of addressing the more pronounced agency problems in these 
large firms (Alsaeed, 2006; Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). Thus a positive association 
between firm size and level of FLD is anticipated. 
2.2.4 Liquidity  
Liquidity risk management strategies have been found to be related to corporate disclosures. 
Consistent with the signaling theory, firms that disclose more information are characterized 
by high liquidity ratios. This is meant to distinguish them from those firms experiencing high 
liquidity risks. Extant research has produced mixed findings on the association between 
liquidity and the level of corporate disclosures. Wallace et al. (1994) establish a negative 
relationship while Elzahar and Hussainey (2012) establish an insignificant association. 
Marshall and Weetman (2007) and Elshandidy et al. (2011) establish that firms that have high 
liquidity ratios transmit positive signals to the market participants. In this case, it is difficult 
to anticipate the direction of influence of liquidity on FLDs. 
2.2.5 Capital expenditure 
The level of investment in capital investments has been found to have an association with 
agency-related issues. A firm that invests more in non-current assets is expected to reduce 
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agency problems with its owners. The information signaled by capital investments is that the 
company is investing the shareholders‟ funds to generate more value. In such a case, less 
agency problems are expected in such a firm. If such a company discloses such information 
relating to future investments, then that would influence investor‟s decisions to a great extent. 
Likewise, a firm that has invested heavily in capital investments is likely to disclose more 
FLI which contains additional disclosures indicating the performance of the investments. 
Such information is perceived as potentially useful for external investment purposes by 
investors and financial analysts. Al-Qudah, Walker and Lonnie (1991) posit that companies 
are more likely to disclose news about their capital expenditure intentions when finance 
directors perceive so, due to requirement to do so and when the news relate to an increase 
rather than a decrease in capital expenditure. In this study, a positive relation between capital 
expenditure and FLDs is anticipated. 
2.2.6 Sector type 
The type of sector a firm operates in has been found to influence the disclosure of FLI. 
Positive association has been found to exist between sector type and the disclosure of risk 
information. Cooke (1989) found that a significant relationship exists between sector type 
and disclosure. Other studies have established an insignificant relationship between sector 
type and annual disclosures (Wallace et al. 1994). The general proposition in this study is that, 
there exists sectoral influence on the level of corporate FLDs. 
2.2.7 Cross listing 
Cross-listing has been found to have an influence on the level of corporate disclosures. 
Mangena and Pike (2005) and Rajab and Handley-Schachler (2009) found a positive 
association between cross-listing and corporate disclosures. Cross-listing exposes a firm to 
more market participants, hence, more sources of finance. It also aggravates agency problems. 
In so doing, cross-listed firms are forced to provide more disclosures in their financial 
statements. Surprisingly, Taylor et al. (2010) found that cross-listing has a negative 
association with corporate risk disclosures. This could be explained by the fact that 
cross-listed firms are fairly large and thus, they enjoy economies of scale. They are thus 
bound to survive even without providing the additional disclosures. Therefore, it becomes 
difficult to predict the nature of association between cross-listed firms and FLDs. 
2.2.8 Institutional ownership 
Institutional ownership has been found to influence the nature and the level of corporate 
disclosures. Mangena and Pike (2005) established a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and corporate disclosures. This may be taken to imply that locally 
owned firms provide less risk disclosures compared to foreign-controlled firms. On the 
contrary, other studies have established an insignificant relation between the two variables 
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3. Research Methodology 
3.1 Data  
Data for the study were collected from 91 firm-years on firms listed on the Nairobi Securities 
Exchange for the interim periods between 2009 and 2011. The firms samples in each of the 
interim periods in the three years are 11, 39 and 41 respectively. The choice of the firms and 
the period was based on the availability and completeness of data. The data collected relates 
to the first-half of the IFRs. For the purpose of this study, all financial firms (mainly 
commercial banks and insurance firms) were excluded. This is because financial reporting for 
banks and insurance firms in Kenya is regulated by other bodies –the Central Bank of Kenya 
(CBK) and the Insurance Regulatory Authority (IRA). To ensure fair-level data analysis, only 
those firms not listed under the two segments were used in the study. 
Consistent with Hussainey et al. (2003) and Aljifri and Hussainey (2007), the study adopts 
the same list of forward-looking words to examine the extent of disclosure of FLI. A 
dichotomous procedure is adopted. If a FLD sentence is identified, the item scores one if it is 
disclosed and zero if it is not disclosed.  
The extent of FLD is measured as the ratio of the number of forward-looking sentences a firm 
discloses scaled by the total number of sentences in its narrative section in the IFR. Using the 
developed disclosure index, the study then examines the association between the extent of 
FLD and the identified firm characteristics. The forward disclosure score (FWD) a firm 
scores is additive and depends on the number of sentences it discloses which contain the 
forward-looking phrases. 
FWD = Σ di 
Where FWD refers to the forward-looking sentences disclosed and di = 1 if the sentence 
contains a forward-looking phrase and 0 if not.  
 
The FLD index (FLD) for each firm thus becomes FWD/MDS  
 
Where MDS is the maximum disclosure provided by the firm in its interim financial report. 
 
3.2 Empirical model 
Following Aljifri and Hussainey (2007), a backward linear regression analysis is employed to 
test the hypotheses under investigation. This model incorporates the FLD as the dependent 
variable. The determinants of FLDs are introduced as independent variables. The model used 
is as follows: 
 
FLDit = β0 + β1LEVit + β2ROEit + β3SIZEit + β4LIQUIDit + β5CAPEXit +OWNit + 
CROSSLISTit + λit+ ρit + ηit + it 
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Where FLD represents the FLD index, LEV represents leverage. ROE represents firm 
profitability, SIZE represents firm size, LIQUID measures liquidity, CAPEX represents capital 
expenditure investment, OWN represents a dummy variable indicating 1 for foreign 
ownership and 0 otherwise, CROSSLIST indicates a dummy variable of 1 if the firm is 
cross-listed and 0 otherwise. Variable λit captures the unobservable heterogeneity in the firms. 
Variables ρit, and ηit represent sectoral and firm-year controls respectively. i represents 
independent random disturbances. 
In this study, leverage was measured by total debt scaled by total assets. Profitability was 
measured as net income after tax scaled by shareholders funds. Firm size is measured the 
natural logarithm of the firm‟s total assets
1
. Liquidity is measured by current assets scaled by 
current liabilities. Capital expenditure is measured by the ratio of non-current assets scaled by 
total assets. Sector variables are measured by introducing ten dummy variables (0,1). Cross 
listing was also measured by a dummy variable with 1 representing cross listed firms and 
zero if otherwise. Finally, a dummy variable (0,1) was introduced to indicate foreign 
ownership (1) and local ownership (0).  
Variance inflation factors (VIFs) were utilized to check whether multicollinearity was a 
problem amongst the identified variables. The VIFs ranged between 0≤VIF≤3 meaning that 
multicollinearity was not a problem since this was within the limits prescribed by 
Montgomery and Peck (1982) and also Chartlergee and Price (1977). 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1 Univariate analysis 
In this section, empirical methods used to examine the determinants of FLDs of the study and 
the results are presented.  Table 1 presents summary statistics on key variables used in the 
study. Overall, the mean (median) FLD index is 16.9% (18.2%) which is relatively low. A 
typical firm has a mean leverage ratio of 16.9% with profitability of 2.9%. The descriptive 











                                                        
1 Aljifri and Hussainey (2007) measured firm size as natural log of net sales. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics of key variables 
Variable 25% Median 75% Mean StDev 
FLD index (FLD) 0.052 0.182 0.250 0.169 0.136 
Independent variables   
 
  
Financial risk measures   
 
  
Sales (KShs. „millions‟) 703 2,320 8,718 9,435 16,084 
Leverage (LEV) 0.000 0.007 0.327 0.169 0.240 
Profitability (ROE) 0.019 0.058 0.103 0.029 0.187 
Agency cost  measures   
 
  
   Total assets (KShs. „millions‟) 1,867 5,637 18,154 22,462 43,584 
   Firm size (SIZE) 7.543 8.654 9.811 8.690 1.825 
   Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) 0.281 0.577 0.749 0.525 0.260 
Liquidity risk measures   
 
  
 Current ratio (LIQUID) 1.095 1.454 2.123 2.015 2.247 
Institutional ownership (OWN) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.231 0.424 
Cross listed (CROSSLIST) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.110 0.314 
 
Table 2 presents the Spearman correlation coefficients. The table shows that leverage, return 
on assets and ownership is positively correlated with FLDs. The table also shows that 
cross-listing has a negative association with FLDs. 
 
Table 2: Spearman correlation coefficients matrix 
 
FLD LEV ROE SIZE LIQUID  CAPEX OWN  
LEV 0.091*       
ROE 0.209** -0.281***      
SIZE 0.155 -0.021 0.197*     
LIQUID 0.116 -0.306*** 0.062 -0.168    
 CAPEX 0.069 0.034 -0.061 -0.019 -0.247   
OWN 0.031* -0.083 0.067 -0.149 -0.169* -0.141  
CROSSLIST -0.180* -0.027 0.312*** 0.259** -0.029 -0.117 -0.026 
FLD index – FLD; Leverage –LEV; Return on Equity – ROE; Firm Size –SIZE; liquidity 
measure – LIQUID; Capital Expenditure –CAPEX; Institutional ownership – OWN; Cross 
listing – CROSSLIST. Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are used to compute 
t-values, which are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance levels at the 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
4.2 Multivariate analysis 
To examine the determinants of FLDs, the FLD index is modeled as a function of the possible 
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determinants. Table 3 presents the results from the multiple regression estimation. Two 
models namely, the two-stage least squares and heteroskedastic panel corrected standard 
errors estimation models are used to provide robust results from the collected data. Both 
models address the weaknesses inherent in panel data and help in improving the reliability of 
the results. 
 
Table 3: Determinants of forward-looking disclosures 
Dependent variable: Forward-lookind disclosure index (FLD) 
 











































 0.123 0.289 
N  91 91 
This table presents regression estimates on the determinants of FLDs in interim financial 
statements of firms listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange for the periods 2009 – 2011. 
Model (1)  has been estimated using the two-stage least squares. T values are shown in 
parentheses. Model (2) has been estimated using heteroskedastic panel corrected standard 
errors estimation model. In Model 2, heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are used to 
compute t-values, which are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance levels 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
The results in table 3 show that a significant positive association between FLDs and leverage 
exists (p<0.05). This finding confirms the proposition by Aljifri and Hussainey (2007) who 
argue that firms that experience significant increase in gearing are likely to disclose more FLI. 
Highly geared firms  face higher financial risk. From an agency perspective, providing more 
FLDs is one way of mitigating the adverse effects of high debt levels. The suppliers of 
finance and investors need to know how the firm is utilising the debt. In this case, firms are 
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forced to provide disclosures regarding their future prospects and how the funds have been 
spent. 
Profitability is also significant and positively related to FLDs (p<0.000). This finding is 
consistent with Wallace et al. (1994) and Butler et al. (2006) who found a positive relation 
between corporate disclosures and profitability. The finding seems to suggest that more 
profitable firms disclose more FLDs. The long run effect of these disclosures is an 
improvement in firm value and market position. On the other hand, more profitable firms 
tend to have a greater bargaining power. They are thus able to source funds from many 
sources. Providing more FLDs serves as a way of showing that they are profitable and this 
increases investor and creditor confidence in the firm. 
The level of FLD is also positively related with capital expenditures (p<0.01). This finding 
seems to suggest that the more capital expenditure a firm has, the more the level of FLDs it 
provides. The increase FLD is meant to explain to the stakeholders how the firm is currently 
utilizing its investment in non-current assets. Al-Qudah et al. (1991) posit that firms provide 
more disclosures if their investments in capital expenditure is likely to increase. This means 
that, given the existing level of investment in capital assets, additional disclosures would be 
meant to minimize agency problems and increase investor confidence in the firm‟s 
management. 
Institutional ownership is also significant and positively related to the FLDs (p<0.05).  This 
finding suggests that foreign firms disclose more FLI due to pressure exerted on them. 
Consistent with Mangena and Pike (2005), such firms have to provide additional disclosures 
to convince the foreign owners that the management is doing something to create value for 
them. Cross-listing was also found to be a significant determinant of FLDs at the 10% level. 
This implies that cross listing does not enhance the firm‟s propensity to provide more 
disclosures. 
Finally firm size, liquidity and sector type were found to be insignificant determinants of 
FLDs. This is consistent with Elzahar and Hussainey (2012) who found insignificant relation 
between corporate disclosures and liquidity. These results are also consistent with previous 
studies such as McNally et al. (1982) and Wallace et al. (1994) who found insignificant 
association between sector type and corporate disclosures.  
5. Conclusion 
In this study, an examination of the determinants of FLDs in IFRs for non-financial firms 
listed on the NSE for the mid interim periods between 2009 and 2011 is presented. Using 
regression analysis, the results show that firms with higher debt, better performance, higher 
capital investment and with more concentration of foreign investment tend to have more 
FLDs in their IFRs. Conversely, cross listed firms are associated with lower FLDs. This 
implies that cross-listing does not improve the firm‟s disclosures. Results show a high degree 
of FLD for better performing firms and firms with higher financial risk. The study suffers 
from the following limitations. First, the availability of IFRs on the firms was a challenge. 
This led to the selection of 91 firm-years for firms whose IFRs were readily available. Second, 
the findings in this study have been performed for three interim financial periods. This means 
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that one has to be careful when generalizing the findings from this study. A longer period of 
study is expected to provide more generalisable results. Discussions with the management of 
the firms in the study regarding the phenomenon under examination would certainly improve 
the results. These limitations withstanding, the findings in the study would prove beneficial to 
financial analysts, academicians, regulators and investors. As a conclusion, the paper 
recommends firms to provide comprehensive FLDs in future to effectively mitigate 
informational asymmetries between the management and owners of the firms, especially 
firms with more concentrated foreign ownership. Further research could investigate any other 
constructs linked to FLDs (for example, market reaction). 
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